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The a.bil:j.ty of a :fluent speaker of English includes his 
mastery of derivationally related forms. ~'\!hat he kno.w:s about 
derivational morphology must be part of the grammar of Englisht 
but it not clear just how the various aspects of this know-
ledge ahould be accounted for. 
It is clear that the things we know about our language 
must either be regularities of structure, such as how questions 
are formed, which are accounted for by rules in the grammar, 
either universal or language-particular, or they must be idio..,. 
syncratic facts, euch as what the plural of child is, which are 
represented as information accompanying an item in the lexicon. 
In the case of our ability to use derivationally related 
forms, not only is the formal ace.cunt of what ')'e know sometimes 
difficult to arrive at, but it is not altogether obvious just 
what it is that we know. 
The following is an attempt to demonstrate that this is the 
case. 
Some affixes are, generally and intuitively speaking, pro-
ductive, e.g., -~ as in washable, which is so productive that 
we can make up new forms like doable. However, there are 
certain (classes of?} forms for which the addition of-able is-
not possible, e.g., verbs which take resuHative objects like 
build. This affix cannot be applied to two....word verbs, or to 
verb + preposition combinations: *pickable up, * pick u;eable, 
ll'talkable to, *talk toable. However, listenable does appear, 
although listen requires to: *He listened the singer, She's a 
very listen.able singer. We can imagine the creation of a word 
*talkable, as in 
*He's very talkable 
meaning, He's easy to talk to, though it does not a<:tually appear .. 
Listenable may have resulted in this way, from an attempt to put 
-able on a verb+ pre:posit.ion combination. This seems to be a 
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fairly clear-cut example 0£ a syntactic rule ,vh:i.ch a_llow.s the 
derivaticin 0£ a sentence like 
This coat is washable 
from the stl'!ucture underlying 
One can wash this coat. 
\Ile si.mply do not know yet e:icactl;t what the environments are £or 
the application of this rule. 
The speaker is capable of recogn.izing the structure of 
derh·ed words, as ungentlemanliness. By {issigning two different 
structures, we can represent the ambiguity of a word like 
untieable. Also. the speaker can recognize the structure in, and 
in this way understand the meaning of 1 complex words which do 
not seem to conform to the usual derivational processes, such as 
unthinkable and Eerishable, to say nothing of listenable, thus 
disallowing the possibility 0£ listing such words as monomorphemic 
in the lexicon. The other alternative, though, for derivi~g 
these forms is by means of the general rule by which -able is 
added to certain verbs, but this rule obviously does not-apply 
generally to intransitive or two-word verbs like 12erish or think 
(about). But, how are we to predict their semantic interpreta-
tio~, since it cannot come from the usual rules, and how exactly 
are we to represe~t the fact that they should not exist at all? 
This question has implications beyond the scope of deriva-
tional morphology- alone. Consider 1 for example, the usual treat-
ment o:f irregular plurals in a transformational grammar, accom-
plished by using the notion of rule-ordering. The rule ox+ 
Plural ....,. ~ is givent along with other sueh rules, be.fore the 
rule for the formation of regular plurals. Thus, we know that 
the plural of£!. is~· But how do we represent the intuition 
that the plural of .21!. OUGHf TO BE oxes? The received conception 
of ordered rules is one in which earlier rµles take no aceount 
of later rui,s. The rules for plurals in English are composed 
of a group of irregular rules followed by a single general rule. 
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But there is no way at present to distinguish this situation 
from that in a language in which there is no such thing as a 
regular plural. That is to say, given a set of rules such as 
the plural rule for~, there is no way to express the fact 
that they are followed by a regular rule, which should apply to 
the words in this set. 
There is further the question of our ability to recognize 
the stru.cture of words with learned affixes, such as -ology, 
etc.~ and of words such as loquacious and loquacityt where the 
' 1stemtt does not exist. We cannot list these last two, for 
example, separately in the lexicon, since this would not indi-
cate the obvious relationship between them, but the verb "'log_t 
uto speak frequently, 11 is scarcely a.s credible a back-formation 
as, say, *,agresp• (Such non-occurring base forms are discussed 
by George Lako ff in On the nature of syntactic irree;ulari t:i,• ! 
Computation LabOl:"atory 1 Harvard University, Report No. NSF-16 1 
Cambridge, 1965.) 
In most cases where there is more than one affix with the 
same meaning, as dishonest but unhappy, a given word will take 
only one: •unhonest, ~dishaEPY· But in unmeasurable and 
immeasurable, we find two different forms of the negative affix 
on the same word, giv:ing two semantically distinct forms. 
The size of a virus is unmeasurable without an electron 
microscope. 
The ~ind boggles at the contemplation of the immeasur-
able depths of interstellar space. 
How can we represent the derivation of these words formally? 
It is at least initially plausible to say that they both have 
the deep structure NEG+ measurable, but what we have £s two 
different ttshades 11 of not measurable. Furthermore, we have such 
sets as unassembled, disassembled; displace, misplace; unmoral, 
amoral, immoral. 
The general problem of acceptable vs. unacceptable back-
and ''front-" formations .should be considered. Why is •agp.:ress 
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beli!l!vable from agg1'essive, aggressor, etc., but r.61;. •ten, from 
tenacio·us and tenaci tz, as in th¢ tdple ra_pe,, ra;eacious 1 
raI)acity? Why do '*wetten and "hotten, i11. the pattern of moisten, 
sound better than *stickx_en and "tbinnen rrn the same pattern? 
Since these.are intuitions, we have about forms never heard before, 
they must be bas...d on certain rules. But l.'1hat rules? Does 
thi..s constitute evidence for considering tte addition of the"'"!!! 
causative suffix to be a rule, even though no comm.Qn feature has 
so far be;:;n found which could chara.cterize as a the forms 
with which it is found? 
Nominaliza.tions may perhaps b.e said to be inherently abstract, 
but certain of them are 11 concretizable," while others are not. 
,fu).sis;nation is c'ommonly uaed in both ways, whereas agitation and 
knowledge can only be abstract. 
My resignation took only a few minutes. 
My secretary typed my resignation for me. 
*This is my knowledge of flying ants. (said of a piece 
of paper on which you have written all you 
know of flying an ts.) 
The word proliferation, on the third hand, while commonly used 
only a5 abstract, can be imagined ae a concrete noun. 
?Look at that proliferation of flying ants. 
*Look at that agitation of people. 
If nominalizations are formed by the operation of certain regular 
syntactic r~les, (and there ia abundant evidence for considering 
that they are), then how can this arbitrary information be 
associated with the newl;r created form? 
A similar problem is encountered in the case o·f a derived 
form which has a meaning which could not be predicted from the 
meanings of the stem and the affix. E.g. 1 neither ignorant nor 
the phrase ignorant o! have mea11ings that co~ld be gleaned by 
simply knowing that they are adjective forms of the verb ignore; 
considerate is not an attribute of one who considers. 
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There are cases in which we do not even have the evidence 
of naw formations which seem intuitively correct to determine 
whether or not there are rules operating. Consider our know-
ledge of 'h'hich words take an -ist agentive suffix. Cyclist and 
!ZEist seem to be exa~ples of phonological exceptions to the rule 
which adds -er to verbs. But -ist seems to be the unmarked 
agentive suffix for players of musical instruments: flutist, 
Pianist, with trumpeter as an exception. If questioned as to 
what to call someone who plays a sackbutt, however, at least the 
authors find themselves with no intuitions on the prcferability 
of either sackbutter or sackbuttist. Then is the addition of 
-ist to the names of musical instruments an example of a rule? 
These paradoxes illustrate cases in which neither lexical 
lists or syntactic rules, which are the only two available means, 
provide .a satisfactory account of certain aspects of a fluent 
speaker's ability to use his language. The imFortant considera-
tion in arriving at a solution to this problem is an account of 
how we arrive at the knowledge that we exhibit of these forms 
and the relationships among them. It is obvious that the forms 
of the grammar must be constrained by learning-theoretical 
considerations. Otherwise, we would have no grounds for objec-
ting to any conceivable rule ~echanism, including mirror-i~age 
sentences and the like. 
All of this indicates that tl:e solu Lions made available by 
the presenl form of the grammar are not sufficient. 
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